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Abstract 
This article tries to develop a new theory of reactionary ideology.  It does so by applying a 
rhetorical approach.  Because to do so is to follow in the footsteps of Albert O. Hirschman, 
the structure of the article is a critical discussion of his thesis.  The revised theory aims to 
improve on Hirschman’s earlier version, first by rethinking the nature of rhetoric, and second 
by offering a more satisfactory definition of reaction itself.  It is argued that reaction should 
not be identified with the political Right at large.  Nonetheless, it comprises a seam that runs 
right through the Right’s history, and down into the present.  This is presented as reaction’s 
identifying ‘rhetorical repertoire’.  When Hirschman finds evidence of arguments from 
‘perversity’, ‘futility’, and ‘jeopardy’, he is only offering a theory of conservatism.  Reaction 
is distinct, even if one advantage of the rhetorical approach is to allow that its boundaries 
with other ideological traditions might be fuzzy, rather than rigid.  Prospectively, we will 
better understand reaction as a repertoire of appeals to ‘indignation’, ‘decadence, and 
‘conspiracy’. 
 
Keywords      Reaction – rhetoric – Hirschman – ideology – political Right 
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To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction 
Isaac Newton’s third law of motion1 
 
Introduction 
What is reactionary ideology? How does it function? Neither of these questions is settled, but 
they are prompted by basic problems of definition, which extend, perhaps, to the political 
Right in general.
2
  The aim of the article is to offer a new theory of reactionary politics, one 
that might, in particular, give clarity to its standing in relation to the Right at large. 
There is a simple sense to reaction, which is contained in Newton’s laws of motion.  
This says that to be a reactionary is to oppose things – actions.  But beyond this, it is not at all 
clear what the substance of reactionary ideology comprises.  Nor is it readily apparent how 
and why it should persist, cohere and appeal.  For instance, if reaction is in one aspect defined 
by opposition, then it must only be a mystery why any more generic ideational structure 
should persist over time.  Since in the fullness of time, what the reactionary opposes surely 
changes? The nature of the appeal of reaction is no more obvious.  For at some point, this can 
only beg the question, ‘who would not back “progress”?’ In contemporary politics, it is 
perhaps reaction’s unity and coherence which is most moot, especially in respect of the 
broader political Right.  Where does reactionary ideology begin and end? Does it come in 
hard and soft versions? How does this bear on the character of political parties – established 
or otherwise?  Although the account of reactionary ideology to be developed is constructed 
out of intellectual history, it is hoped that what is proposed illuminates the present, too.  
Certainly, there is evidence of a popular perception that reaction does continue to appeal, 
even if the rigorous analysis remains missing.  For instance, newspaper editorials quite 
regularly locate public support for contemporary political parties like the UK Independence 
Party in a ‘generally reactionary ideological identity’.  But they are tentative and speculative 
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when it comes to enumerating the content of that identity, tending to make do with vague lists 
of beliefs.
3
  In the least, they provide no leverage on how the component parts of a 
reactionary ideology fit together, quite irrespective of whether they do identify these 
component parts correctly.  
The principal aim of what follows, then, is to develop a new theory of reactionary 
ideology.  The decisive move is the selection of method.  In this, the article has a secondary 
aim in mind.  This is to illustrate the usefulness of one distinct approach to the study of 
ideology. And to suggest that, though this approach may well be unable to do all the 
analytical work required in this field of study, it may have highly valuable application to 
certain ideological phenomena.  It is, so the article contends, a rhetorical approach to 
ideology which has special application to reaction, ahead of the more familiar approaches.   
Lastly let us clear the ground, so that the analysis may proceed, by reflecting on the 
advantages that a rhetorical approach has in this case. 
 
To give analytical priority to the place of rhetoric in the study of ideology is to press for a 
shift in the level of analysis privileged.
4
  So we should consider the alternative levels of 
analysis and their limits in application to reaction.  These are threefold.
5
   
First, ‘dispositions’.   In the general study of the political Right, dispositions have 
proven productive before. Michael Oakeshott’s idea of the ‘conservative disposition’, for 
example, is well-known.
6
 This is not the only reason to suppose that a dispositional approach 
might be relevant, because if to refuse to back progress is indeed idiosyncratic, then there 
may be something to be said for theorising the ‘reactionary personality’ or similar.  But this 
points to the first advantage of rhetoric.  As in the dispositional approach, rhetoric will give 
potential coverage to the non-rational. Yet it will make no assumption that a unique 
personality-type is simply ‘out there’, waiting for the analyst to find him or her.  Still less will 
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rhetoric ‘demonise’ that type.  One consideration in this must be that, unlike conservatives, 
reactionaries rarely self-identify as such, posing interpretation a distinctive challenge. 
 A second alternative to rhetoric is to take ‘social interests’ as the level of analysis 
instead.  In other words, this might be called the sociological approach.  Not individual 
personalities, but particular social groups, take up reactionary positions – consisting in, say, 
recurring defences of waning political and social orders.  Collective, rather than idiosyncratic, 
articulations of reaction may therefore enter focus.  But for the analyst of rhetoric, we can 
picture a second type of reductionism, as follows.  The wise analyst will not want to rule out 
the presence of strategic calculations in such defences (for more on this, see below).  But 
contrary to the sociological approach, there ought to be no prejudice against treating these 
defences at face value, in favour of viewing them as (mere) surface effects of underlying 
causes.
7
 
   Of course, a rhetorical approach will not be alone in allowing reactionaries to ‘speak 
for themselves’.  That is because, third, a conceptual approach will provide the same 
rationale.  But here, we may contend, there is an important space between the two which 
needs highlighting.  The value of a conceptual approach to the study of ideology is widely 
appreciated.
8
  There may be reason to think that it has good application, notably, to 
conservatism.
9
  But is it best suited to apprehending reaction?  At the level of analysis, by 
adopting the conceptual approach, we would then be encouraged to try to isolate 
configurations of political values, ones that we might find are recurrent in (collective) 
articulations of reactionary ideology; and which – crucially – exhibit logical consistency.  Yet 
this is where rhetoric may have particular traction in a certain case.  We should have no 
expectation that ‘reactionaries’ will necessarily speak about the world in consistent ways 
(opponents, after all, will likely allege the precise opposite).  And it is employing the 
rhetorical approach which permits us to be open to this possibility.  This is because the plea 
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of its strongest advocates is that analysts of ideology need to reallocate their labours: away 
from attention to the internal organisation of the object of their inquiry – where logical 
consistency is at a premium, and towards its external presentation, or ‘face’ – where it is 
not.
10
 
Our analysis, therefore, will proceed from this plea.  But it will not proceed ex nihilo.  
The thesis of Albert O. Hirschman in The Rhetoric of Reaction is both influential and 
informed by many of the methodological tenets just discussed, even if not in whole.  In what 
follows, Hirschman’s study therefore serves as a foil to the new theory of reactionary rhetoric 
which the article proposes.
11
  The structure is as follows.  Initially, Hirschman’s thesis is 
rehearsed.  Thereafter, a critical discussion is staged, and in two parts.  First, this discussion 
figures around Hirschman’s conception of rhetoric, developing some of the tenets above.  
Second, the discussion concerns his conception of reaction, where it is argued that Hirschman 
is guilty of assimilating reaction to the political Right in general.  Reconsidered conceptions 
of rhetoric and reaction are then used to inform the construction of the new theory, which by 
the point of conclusion has been developed as an alternative to Hirschman’s own.  The 
historical character of Hirschman’s framework, to be described forthwith, is imitated in the 
later three sections.  This is because imitation both suitably reinforces the critique of his 
account, while illustrating the persuasiveness of the new theory suggested. 
 
The Legacy of Albert O. Hirschman 
Hirschman’s concerns in The Rhetoric of Reaction (1991) were very much like those so far 
set out. His own inspiration was present-day politics.  It was in trying to explain the 
ascendancy, in the Anglo-American world especially, of the Right in the 1980s, that 
Hirschman was taken to rhetoric, and with unchecked originality in his case.  His account 
involved disavowing both the dispositional and sociological approach: their adherents, he 
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said, were wrong to detract from the level of ‘surface’ expression in political life.  He also 
rejected the conceptual approach, because he made very explicit room for the idea that 
reactionaries will likely invoke ‘almost opposite’ understandings of the political and social 
world. So his focus, instead, was on how people in modern society argued about their 
common affairs.
12
  
What did Hirschman conclude? He came to the view that reactionary ideology 
consisted in three ‘major polemical postures and manoeuvres’, or three moves that were 
‘likely to be engaged in by those who set out to debunk and overturn “progressive” policies 
and movements of ideas’.13  And these, as noted, could be found in their origin at historical 
intervals which were largely discrete.  Hence intellectual history was Hirschman’s source-
material, where we follow.  Hirschman drew on T.H. Marshall’s developmental model of 
citizenship to generate this framework.  Marshall’s model stated: first civil citizenship, then 
its combination with political citizenship, before their extension to socio-economic 
citizenship.  For Hirschman, those were particular ‘progressive’ achievements; they prompted 
corresponding reactionary ‘counterthrusts’, available for use thereafter.  In sum, three 
reactionary arguments were (albeit distinct in origin) persistent in modern political 
experience, from the era of the French Revolution onwards.  The following is Hirschman’s 
full set. 
First, the ‘perversity’ argument.  This initially checked the ‘Rights of Man’ and the 
rise of individual liberty.  It asserted that, however well-intentioned, reform will render the 
problem at hand even worse (‘Everything backfires’).14 Edmund Burke and Joseph de Maistre 
made this claim foundational to reactionary ideology, in denunciation of the French 
revolutionaries: the consequence of striving for the public good is, to the contrary, public 
evil.  But, as Hirschman showed, at later intervals that pattern reappeared.  For example, a 
later echo was the claim that universal suffrage leads not to freedom, but to (new) despotism.  
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Second, the ‘futility’ argument.  This emerged, in its most characteristic expression, in 
response to the rise of democracy: reform will be wholly ineffective in solving whatever 
problem is at hand (‘plus ça change plus c’est la même chose’).  Thus, the maxim shared by 
the Italian ‘elite theorists’, Gaetano Mosca, Vilfredo Pareto and Roberto Michels stated that  
the outward appearance of democracy changes nothing of the ruler/ ruled distinction.
15
  
Third came the ‘jeopardy’ argument, which received particularly forceful expression 
in the hands of those opposing the rise of the welfare state.  Reform, ‘jeopardy’ said, will 
imperil some gains won earlier at significant cost (‘ceci tuera cela’ – this will kill that).  
Friedrich von Hayek was emblematic of the claim that ‘collectivism’ endangers liberty.  That 
said, jeopardy had been intimated earlier: when it did not appear futile, democracy (like 
collectivism also) endangered liberty.
16
 
 
Together, the ‘perversity’, ‘futility’ and ‘jeopardy’ arguments form quite an established 
shorthand for Hirschman’s thesis.  And it often appears as such in textbooks.  But what we 
have are both strengths and weaknesses.  In the interpretation of reactionary ideology, 
Hirschman’s legacy is to have pressed home the advantages of a rhetorical approach, by 
offering a particular application—neither the only, nor the best, application. 
To repeat the strengths of Hirschman’s thesis first, the desire to avoid reductionism, 
of either the dispositional or sociological kind, is on the mark.  At least, the possibility should 
not be discounted that reaction’s identity owes everything to real-world processes of 
argumentation, being very far from available to be ‘read off’ from prior dictates.  Also astute 
is Hirschman’s appreciation that points of logical contradiction might be present in 
reactionary ideology; though furthermore, that these may be no necessary hindrance to that 
ideology’s success.  The three arguments themselves contradict.  Logically, reforms cannot 
be ineffectual (‘futile’), while jeopardising other ends.  Less starkly, the background beliefs 
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that support perversity (myth and religion) are typically in tension with those that support 
futility (from ‘science’).  Yet Hirschman’s theory expressly accommodates the likelihood that 
the different reactionary arguments will be ‘used in the course of the same debate, sometimes 
even by the same person or group’.17  
But next, to the weaknesses. The key limitations are twofold.  We aim to offer an 
improved application of a rhetorical approach to reactionary ideology by, first, reconsidering 
rhetoric and, second, reconsidering reaction.
18
   A new term might also be useful.  Hirschman 
proposes one ‘rhetorical repertoire’; we still stand in need of a persuasive alternative, which 
constitutes the repertoire to be suggested in the remainder of the article.  ‘Repertoire’ is 
especially appropriate because of its twin connotations of performance and regularly-used 
techniques.   
 
Rhetoric reconsidered: Beyond rationalisation and reason 
Hirschman’s practical conception of rhetoric has itself two weaknesses.  The first is to model 
rhetoric on a theory of strategic action. The second is to present rhetoric as if it were 
exclusively ratiocinative.  We need to move rhetoric beyond rationalisation and, indeed, 
beyond reason, respectively. 
 First, as noted earlier, a rhetorical approach to reaction will aim to transcend 
reductionism to ‘interests’, without precluding the possibility that reaction’s rhetoricians 
might make strategic calculations about the messages they transmit, on the basis of ends they 
have in view.  The contrary would be very odd, since we might even imagine that, on the 
rhetorical approach, it is axiomatic that ideological messages will be tailored to projected 
audiences.
19
  But Hirschman amplifies the role of strategic calculations.  He conceives the 
subject-matter of rhetoric, on a model more widely shared,
20
 as ex post facto rationalisation – 
rationalisation, that is, of an interest fixed prior to the articulation of discourse.  Ultimately, 
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on careful consideration, this is not really a question of degree – how much, or how little, 
strategy to expect to be in play? Rather, it is a question of belief-formation.  Practically-
speaking, the relevant point is simply this: not only, with Hirschman, do the problems of a 
sociological approach threaten to reintrude, but before that, as it were, Hirschman curtails the 
capacity of rhetoric to do justice to the way that reactionaries subjectively view the world.  
‘Surface’ might be tailored, but not ‘insincere’.  There is a more productive conception of 
rhetoric in which, rather than rationalisation – or the specious explanation of beliefs – 
rhetoric can be as much about persuading oneself into beliefs, as it is persuading others.
21
   
There is evidence for the claim that Hirschman’s rhetoric fails to go beyond 
rationalisation.  When he finds reactionaries making recourse to inconsistent arguments, he 
prefers to see this as calculating, not unknowing.  He sees the recourse as the rhetorician’s 
rather cynical exploitation of the space for contradiction, in the minds of his or her 
audience(s).  Thus, he argues, there is a deliberate sequence of the three reactionary 
arguments when they are deployed in the typical instance of proposed reform.  ‘Futility’ 
appears first.  But if and when that fails to persuade, i.e. because reforms do look like they 
have effects, then ‘perversity’ and/ or ‘jeopardy’ are called up in futility’s place.  Further 
evidence of the same is the basic, prudential assessment that (Hirschman thinks) reactionary 
spokespersons make: that since, in an unfavourable ‘intellectual climate’, an ‘all-out attack’ 
on progressive objectives is unlikely to command wide support, the optimal strategy instead 
is to make a show of endorsing those objectives, while at the same time demonstrating that 
‘the actions undertaken in their name are ill-conceived’.22  
 So, first of all, Hirschman’s attention to rhetoric is confined unduly to rationalisation.  
The second limitation is to fail to go beyond the ratiocinative.  Here, his interpretation is 
impoverished by asking only a narrow set of questions about reactionary discourse.  Just as 
ceteris paribus reactionaries might sincerely hold any of the views they are given to invoke in 
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order to produce and extend belief, the articulation of those views may operate across any of 
the three modes of ‘proof’ separated in classical rhetoric.23  Yet Hirschman’s account 
proceeds as if one of those alone were important – logos, so that the other two – pathos and 
ethos – could simply be overlooked.  Logos, pathos, and ethos might well be either more or 
less familiar – to the political scientist? – respectively.  But the strongest conception of 
rhetoric will truck no favourite.  Certainly, to follow without favour would be to invoke a 
rhetorical approach which has greater fidelity to Aristotle. 
Logos is what Hirschman’s thesis privileges entirely.  And it comprises the more 
‘formal’ effort at persuasion, through (quasi-) logical reasoning.  We should read ‘perversity’, 
‘futility’ and ‘jeopardy’ alike as being rational ‘propositions’, albeit of a probabilistic rather 
than categorical type.
24
 In common, they invoke the ‘law’ of unintended consequences; in 
each case, ‘how things are’ (the actual) functions as a counterweight to ‘what we want’ (the 
ideal).  Audiences are thereby directed to reach conclusions in logical fashion.  But what 
would make the interpretation of reactionary politics far richer would be attention to the other 
two ‘proofs’, that Hirschman leaves out.  Pathos, in the classical tradition, means the appeal 
to emotion.  So looking forward, this is one additional question to ask of reactionary 
discourse.  What feelings and sentiments are being tapped into? And perhaps further: with 
what intensity? Ethos means the appeal to (a speaker’s) character.  By personality as much as 
stance, ethos involves the activity by which a persuader establishes a connection with a 
persuadee – asserting a shared identity, demonstrating credentials.25  So there is another kind 
of question that is pertinent.  What can we find being communicated in reaction that has the 
projected effect of rendering messages ‘authoritative’?  Lastly, while for the improved 
analysis of reactionary rhetoric two proofs simply need factoring-in, the other, logos, requires 
enlargement.  Hirschman deems recurrent appeals to probability to exhaust the scope of a 
reactionary rhetorical repertoire.  But we should be on the lookout too for the prospective 
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presence of reasoning in its other forms.  These might include appeals to definition, to cause 
and effect, to similarity, to association, or even to the ‘structure of reality’.26  In other words, 
Hirschman’s mistake seems to have been not only to reduce reactionary rhetoric to reasoning, 
but to reasoning of a single type. 
 
Reaction reconsidered: From Change to Historical Time 
We have already, then, several pointers for rereading the history of reactionary ideology on a 
rhetorical approach.  One should  also give particular direction to that rereading by deciding 
whether or not to maintain Hirschman’s conception of reaction itself.  A different way of 
putting this is to say that we need to decide whether Hirschman got his source-material right, 
out of which he constructed the repertoire of perversity, futility, and jeopardy.  This is what 
we should be led to conclude: Hirschman implies that, overall, reactionary politics is oriented 
to the question of ‘change’.  But can one better understand reactionary politics as being held 
together, instead, by the theme of ‘historical time’.  One relevant point is that ‘taxonomies’ of 
the political Right have tended to be too narrow and rigid when, usually, they have isolated 
‘reactionary Right’ as one discrete category – typically, as one involving the defence of  the 
values of feudal aristocratic society.
27
  Hirschman is onto something when he perceives that 
reaction may be more open-ended, in noting that ‘reaction’ may be whatever, generally, 
follows-and-opposes reform.  Nevertheless, in the last analysis, we should be wary of 
identifying reaction with the political Right at large.   
 
The reason why Hirschman makes ‘change’ into reaction’s central theme is because he 
understands that change is, in common, what reactionaries wish to forestall.  Hence, on this 
account, their rhetoric is directed at persuading against reforms, so as to undermine the 
prospects of the change in question.  But our initial step should be to query whether 
Reactionary rhetoric reconsidered 
 
12 
 
opposition is even true of the reactionary’s attitude to change, never mind its centrality.  
Corey Robin, for instance, in The Reactionary Mind, moves reaction far closer to radicalism.  
He contends that the spur to that radicalism is reaction’s foundation in a single principle – 
‘natural hierarchy’.  The successful assertion of hierarchy will, he thinks, in some 
circumstances simply have to entail radicalism.
28
 This analysis is, ultimately, unconvincing – 
at least in full.  (Robin leaves undefended the claim for natural hierarchy’s prime 
importance).  But his basic point should be well met: the reactionary’s attitude to change may 
be anything other than straightforward.  One of his insights is especially valid.  ‘Reaction’ 
should be severed from ‘traditionalism’.  For rather than seeking to maintain tradition in the 
face of threatened change, the goods which reactionaries value may have long stopped being 
lived experience.
29
  
Prima facie, of course, it is more likely that reaction is infused not by radicalism, 
rather by the spirit of ‘pessimism’.  This is consistent with Peter King’s account, Against the 
Modern World, an account that otherwise shares the line of thought that decentres change.  
King, unlike Robin, rightly recognises that reaction is a variegated phenomenon.  It has both 
its ‘elitist’ and ‘populist’ modes, for example, that definition will need to do justice. But 
nonetheless, King suggests that differences like this do cohere around something.  This is a 
basic disaffection with ‘the modern’.30  Pessimism, in the face of the modern, is what is 
instructive in developing our line of thought, since change’s replacement theme of historical 
time now comes into view.  But King’s account has one blind spot, which is where political 
action is concerned.  In respect of action, King attaches reaction to quietism, seeing it largely 
as preoccupied with ‘critique’.31 Certainly, that may be true in some cases.  But the following 
possibility is thereby overlooked.  Reactionaries, as anti-moderns, may be overly pessimistic 
about what a present historical juncture means for individual and society, yet that pessimism 
may serve as an energising force.
32
  So rather than pull toward inertia, reaction may imply 
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activism, in a very particular – if peculiar – key.  It is another commentator, Mark Lilla, who 
encourages us to move towards roughly that position. 
Lilla, before now, has given unqualified primacy to ‘history’ in reactionary ideology, 
having done so in explicit preference to themes like custom, tradition, and human nature.
33
  
But it is the move missing in his account which is our own.  Lilla’s centring of historical time 
is premised on reactionaries arguing with revolutionaries.  In the loose sense history is, for 
him, what these two sides argue about.
34
 Beyond Lilla lies the scope for presenting a new 
conception of reactionary ideology on a rhetorical approach.  Because historical time is 
conceived in rhetorical terms, it becomes more explicitly argumentation’s ‘point of issue’.35  
We should note that Lilla’s account fails to benefit from the analytical advance of conceiving 
matters in rhetorical terms. He still aims to apprehend reaction in the terms of ‘taxonomy’: 
effectively, different types of reactionary are separated in virtue of whether or not they 
entertain the idea of decisive action in relation to history.
36
  But taxonomies can be too rigid –
‘boxing in’ positions taken up across the Right may not be viable.  The advantage of the 
rhetorical approach is to give special weight to what, as we saw, was perhaps Hirschman’s 
most apt insight: that at different times and places, even the same individuals may take up 
dissimilar positions.  To do so permits the likelihood that the boundaries of reaction with 
other ideologies, on the Right especially, will be fuzzy.  This entails neither that reaction 
cannot be given distinct identity, nor that we have to give up on the necessary task of 
interpretive mapping.   
 
Let us at this point sew up the argument being made.  Going forward, if we are to flesh out 
the content of a new rhetorical theory of reactionary ideology, then recognising historical 
time to be reaction’s theme poses the analyst with the choice between two proposals,  modest 
and strong, in which historical time may, respectively, either supplement change or supplant 
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change. The modest proposal would be liable to construct reactionary ideology around two 
‘repertoires’ – one clustered around change (i.e. Hirschman’s set of three appeals to 
unintended consequences), the other clustered around historical time (i.e. so far unspecified).  
Alone, perhaps, the rhetorical perspective would make this modest proposal the more 
attractive. In respect of ideological boundaries, it would potentially capture the opportunities 
open to speakers to move across and between two repertoires, as occasion might demand.  
However, our reconsideration of reaction now supports the strong proposal, according to 
which appealing to historical time is not optional in reactionary ideology, but rather its 
characteristic mode. The opportunity that rhetorical performance opens up for the reactionary 
is rather (as occasion might demand) to move between appeals which in common cluster 
around historical time.  This, to be clear, is the repertoire still in need of specification.  
At this point, we are taken to a very precise, and perhaps equally bold, claim. Rather 
than two rhetorical repertoires of reaction, there are two rhetorical repertoires of the Right.  
What Hirschman really diagnosed was the rhetoric of conservatism.
37
 He gave systematic 
rendition to Oakeshott’s dictum that, rather ‘than readily presume that all change is, 
somehow, for the better’, the conservative is he or she who will see change as a gamble.38  
Reaction has its own rhetoric.  And it is, we might say, a more full-bodied affair. The 
remainder of this article, therefore, shifts attention to the rhetorical features that this 
alternative repertoire (clustered around historical time) might contain.  Replicating 
Hirschman’s historical interpretive framework permits one to pinpoint his wrong turns while 
drawing out three alternative features in the process.  In stages, we see that at each historical 
era which Hirschman isolates, a more fitting feature is exemplified.  We also offer illustration 
of the new theory’s value.  One by-product of the lack of clarity about how to map the 
modern political Right is that many interpretive issues concerning its history are unresolved.  
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We touch on one such issue in the case of each era.  It is suggested that the feature of rhetoric 
exemplified goes some way towards resolving that issue. 
 
Reactionary discourse (i) Counter-Enlightenment 
Was the Counter-Enlightenment continuous with the twentieth-century ‘radical’ Right?   This 
is the first interpretive issue that construction of our repertoire helps to see in a new light.  
We will try to demonstrate that replacing perversity with ‘indignation’ provides not only a 
better sense of how Counter-Enlightenment discourse exemplifies reactionary rhetoric, but 
also of how the continuity of that discourse with later right-wing politics is subtle rather than 
explicit.  For Hirschman, the Counter-Enlightenment seemed to be the very origin of a 
reactionary tradition, although he showed no interest in its connection to later extremism.   
Our renewal of reaction makes that a mistake.  Yet the connection is not easily clarified, as 
disagreement between the Counter-Enlightenment’s ‘continuity’ and ‘discontinuity’ theorists 
attests.
39
  We suggest that theorists of continuity and discontinuity alike neglect the basis for 
inscribing connections here that are non-overt – that exist in rhetoric.  From one of these 
connections it is possible to specify the first element in the new reactionary repertoire. 
 
To review Hirschman’s stance, in The Rhetoric of Reaction Counter-Enlightenment figures 
both as ‘counterthrust’ to early civil rights arguments and as battleground over the lessons of 
the French Revolution.  Hirschman focuses on two texts, which he represents as persuading 
that political experiments staged in the name of the ‘Rights of Man’ can only call forth results 
contrary to those projected.  These are Edmund Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in 
France and Joseph de Maistre’s Considerations on France.  Burke, for Hirschman, asks us to 
accept that ‘attempts to reach for liberty are bound to lead to tyranny instead’, and especially 
when led by abstract reason.
40
  To that, Maistre adds the unflattering contrast between human 
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reason and God’s designs.  In this way Hirschman thinks he has shown that Burke and 
Maistre exemplify reactionary discourse in (his) quasi-logical appeal to perversity.  But, on 
the basis of having reconsidered reaction, all Hirschman has shown, at best, is that their 
perversity arguments are typical to conservatism.   
There is no problem, in this case, with Hirschman’s identification of his source-
material.  Rather, the problem is with the narrow interpretation it is given.  The ‘continuity’ 
theorists of the Counter-Enlightenment and the later Right are not without grounds and 
deserve to be given their due.  What we must note is that they tend to try to make the 
connections explicit at the level of concepts ,but overreach.  Zeev Sternhell is one example.  
Sternhell builds part of his case around the continuity of exclusivist nationalism,
41
  but the 
source-material will not bear this reading out.  To take only the most obvious example – anti-
Semitism –Maistre’s Considerations contains no derogatory references to Jews whatsoever.42  
In Burke’s Reflections, ‘Jew brokers’ supposedly heading the revolutionary government in 
Paris do figure.  Yet this is a clear case where we would be wise to think of the connection to 
the later Right as being subtle and non-overt, rather than explicit and conceptual.  Unless, that 
is, we wish to follow Sternhell in risking the error of anachronism, judging what came before 
by all that came later.
43
  Isaiah Berlin presents a different continuity case, centred on Maistre 
exclusively, and is thereby at risk of reducing reaction to individual ‘dispositions’.   It 
likewise risks anachronism in assimilating Maistre to fascism all too readily: much, if not all, 
of what is argued in Considerations invokes the authority of religion, which would be 
difficult to say of the (Godless?) fascists.  A further weakness of Berlin’s case about Maistre 
is that what seems to be its main plank– the positive valuation of violence – is simply 
vague.
44
  Yet it is in respect of violence, we propose, that the texts merit rereading.   
When thought about carefully, violence offers not a conceptual continuity that 
overreaches, but a code to a rhetorical link that connects Counter-Enlightenment, later Right 
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and, indeed, reactionary ideology per se.  Corey Robin rightly observes that not only, as 
Berlin would have things, is Maistre’s Considerations ‘enlivened by violence’; so is Burke’s 
Reflections, too.
45
  Robin’s own mistake, however, is to run away with this idea.  He is too 
eager to project onto reactionaries a celebration of violence.  Another interpretation is more 
plausible: the reactionaries of the Counter-Enlightenment did linger on violence, though not 
because they wanted to mete violence out, rather because they could not see beyond it.  That 
reluctance is cue to the innovation in rhetoric, operating with pathos at its ‘form of proof’.   
In the literature of Counter-Enlightenment, disenchantment with the French 
Revolution is, for ‘audiences’, made into a matter of correct response to violence.  In 
Reflections, as Tom Paine saw, violence – which, until the Terror, was really episodic – was 
generalised, foregrounded, and given ‘theatrical representation’.46  Hence places (for Burke) 
were ‘left swimming in blood, polluted by massacre, [… ] strewed with scattered limbs and 
mutilated carcases’.47  Violence, for Burke’s post-Terror readers, also had the additional 
rhetorical feature of appearing prophesied, a quality buttressed by Burke’s readiness to play 
Cassandra: ‘In the groves of their academy, at the end of every visto, you see nothing but the 
gallows’. 48  In Considerations, Maistre’s presentation of violence retains the quality of being 
foreseen, via ascription to ‘Providence’, and transfigures also into divine punishment, 
portending restoration of the monarchy in higher (‘purified’) form:  ‘Every drop of Louis 
XVI’s blood will cast torrents of French blood’.49  In passages like these, what demands 
careful interpretation are the feelings to which audiences are directed.  And when we try to 
specify those contents, we are really led not to awe, which is what Robin finds – in 
incitement to admire revolutionaries’ for their ‘hardness’ – but to indignation.50   
To appreciate why, specifically, indignation is apt, we have to consider the 
representation of how violence is not exercised but endured – by its victims.  The 
representation of victimhood in both texts is special indeed.  This is where we are able to 
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pinpoint a kind of deep-lying temper or mood that may be distinctive of reactionary ideology, 
but nonetheless elusive to its analysts.  Considerations makes much of Louis XVI’s 
‘innocence’: in Christianity too, ‘this same dogma of innocence paying for crime’.51  
Reflections makes Marie-Antoinette synecdoche of suffering: this ‘delightful vision’, whose 
threatened insult alone ought to have seen ‘ten thousand swords… leaped from their 
scabbards’.52  Projected in these examples is the quality of sharing in victimhood.  
‘Identification’ of who is and is not ‘victim’ is selective, but inclusive of author and audience 
alike;
53
  hence Paine’s riposte, that Burke ‘pities the plumage, but forgets the dying bird’.54  
To Paine’s prescience, one may add the evoking of ‘history’ in hostile terms.55  Thus, in 
reactionary rhetoric, the malleability of the ‘we’ placed in danger: perhaps that ‘we’ is an 
‘elite’, but perhaps also a ‘nation’, a ‘tradition’, even ‘the West’.  Indignation, as Aristotle 
notes, is an emotion often mobilised in tandem with pity in any act of persuasion.  In both 
indignation and pity, ‘fortune’ – whether good or bad – is experienced as undeserved.56  The 
juxtaposition is instructive, because in the last analysis, we ought to recognise that the 
appeals centred on the fates of Marie-Antoinette and Louis XVI exemplify reactionary 
rhetoric in virtue of being appeals to self-pity.  Accordingly, indignation is directed outwards, 
towards the perpetrators-cum-beneficiaries of those fates.  Self-pity may not necessarily tally 
with envy or jealousy, which is also why some critics only confuse when they equate 
reaction’s pathos instead with resentment.57  Ressentiment is anchored in the Nietzschean 
explanation of the social psychology of the weak and implies there must be a material interest 
at stake in the reactionary’s view of the world.58  But attempts to arouse grief in 
contemplation of those who prosper undeservedly can make for surprising targets – far from 
‘the strong’, which is why a sociological approach may be thought implausible.   
 
Reactionary discourse (ii) Interwar fascism  
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In place of Hirschman’s appeal to perversity, one might inscribe, at the level of pathos, the 
appeal to indignation.  At the same time, this is a clue to how the Counter-Enlightenment 
might be located in continuity with later ‘radical’ discourses, without stretching the readings 
of the texts.  A second historical discourse exemplifies the next feature for the rhetoric of 
reaction proper.  Once more, its extrapolation might go some way towards resolving a 
contested interpretive question – this time, the relation of fascism to a politics of reaction.  On 
this occasion, however, not only does Hirschman mistake the adaptation of reactionary 
ideology in evidence.  He also, despite noting the significance of the early twentieth-century 
as an historical juncture, gets his source-material off.  Hirschman separates fascism from 
reaction.  In so doing, his view is consistent with a latter-day ‘new consensus’ which 
explicitly locates fascism in revolution.
59
  But in this case showing that ‘decadence’ is the 
rhetorical motif exemplified by fascists is also the clue to why that consensus needs to be 
amended, in the detail.  On the one hand, decadence should be understood as providing 
reactionary ideology with its distinctive appeal to logos.  On the other, the reason why 
fascism must still be included under the reactionary heading is that the use of decadence 
involves a very special diagnosis of ‘the present’. 
 
Let us begin again by reviewing Hirschman’s stance.  Hirschman’s attention was drawn to 
the early twentieth-century in considering the critical response to universal suffrage.  Homing 
in on Mosca, Michels and Pareto, typical (he suggested) was a futility argument.  This tried to 
persuade that democracy – for reasons premised on theories of either psychology or 
organisation – was destined to be a sham.  But the fascists were omitted entirely from this 
emerging anti-democratic rhetoric.
60
  This omission is not amenable to resolution by the 
simple insertion of fascism into Hirschman’s existing framework.  Fascism’s activism sits ill 
with futility.  Equally, despite one sympathetic appraisal to that effect, fascism is not 
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adequately theorised as a variation on the jeopardy argument, in which ‘democracy’ threatens 
‘culture’.61  To the contrary, there are good reasons to suppose that fascism has credentials 
that are, variously, ‘activist’, ‘democratic’ and ‘revolutionary’.  But the key point is that 
recognition of these credentials should not lead us to place fascism outside the reactionary 
tradition. Rather the opposite: thinking the issue through unearths the persistence of a 
distinctive appeal to logos that holds this tradition together indeed.  This, as will be shown, 
takes the particular form of an appeal to the structure of reality. 
 The argument that fascism is revolutionary, as made by ‘revisionist’ liberal theorists 
of fascism like Roger Griffin and David Roberts, is a sophisticated one.  It is an extension of 
the claim (made by other liberal theorists earlier) that fascism cannot be understood solely on 
the basis of what it is against: anti-individualism, anti-liberalism, anti-capitalism, anti-
Marxism.
62
  And it involves the contention that fascism is not ‘modernist’ in the 
technological sense alone.
63
 On that theory, what fascism articulates is no less than an 
‘alternative modernity’, pointing beyond democracy in its bourgeois, parliamentarian form.64  
One specific aspect of this articulation is the substantive content that is ‘revolutionary’ – and 
that has revolutionary status in fairly conscious alternative to Marxism’s own equivalent 
content. This content is, likewise, one of a grand future order – albeit an order based, 
culturally, on past-oriented myth.  Interestingly, some Marxist theorists themselves may not 
be as resistant to the argument as imagined, since in a similar line of argument contemporary 
Marxists  theorise the possible outcomes of modern revolutionary processes so that they 
include orders in which ‘workers’ are collectively constituted (not as workers) but as the 
‘people’, ‘nation’, or ‘race’.65  
 For all the argument has going for itself, it requires some moderation.  Its strengths 
should not be in doubt.  The criticism that it takes the ‘appropriation’ of revolutionary 
commitments at face-value cannot hold much water, if our earlier discussion is correct: the 
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rhetorical approach asks us to do just that.
66
  Further, the criticism that the argument invests 
‘revolution’ with dubious definitional criteria, because they are drawn from culture or 
aesthetics, lacks force when the alternative (socio-economic?) criteria are no more self-
evident.
67
  But the advocates of the new consensus in fascism studies defend their case on the 
wrong ground.  Yes, fascism has legitimate revolutionary credentials; but an argument that 
locates fascism’s identity in revolution travels too far.  Its reactionary status needs 
affirmation.  In the wake of the revisionists’ case,  fascism’s connection to a broader 
reactionary tradition needs more careful elucidation than it may have received before, but it 
does not need severing.  Fascism’s peculiarity, as revisionists would bide us recognise, is 
indeed to share with Marxism a ‘utopian’ vision of future ‘rebirth’.68  And certainly, utopian 
prescription of the future is no common denominator between fascism and (other) forms of 
reactionary politics.  However, one such denominator is a diagnosis of the present – absent in 
Marxism - and specifically of present-in-relation-to-past.  It is the appeal to decadence, which 
one finds exemplified in fascist discourse, and explicitly so in virtue of its rhetorical contents.  
  
To date, contemporary theorists of fascism do take note of decadence, as a foretoken of 
rebirth.  They explain it as the ‘dread’ of a ‘diminished vitality’, open to being experienced 
across senses which might be either biological, moral or aesthetic.
69
  Perhaps, though, such 
theorists need to sharpen their attention to the potential richness of decadence’s 
communication, as the numerousness of these senses indicates.
70
  It is because decadence 
rests on an underlying idea of historical time that it allows for the special presentation – 
dramatization? – of the present, and in diverse ways.  A reading of the texts of interwar 
fascism and, for that matter, of the proto-fascism from the decades prior, can be made to 
point inter alia to: the featuring of the word ‘decadence’; the featuring of its synonyms 
(decline, decay, loss); and its more oblique articulation, including via non-verbal mediums.  
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For example, decadence connects the street oratory of Gabriele D’Annunzio to the more 
cerebral formulations of figures such as Oswald Spengler, Charles Maurras, and Maurice 
Barrès.
71
  Spengler’s formulations include this: ‘We cannot help it if we are born as men of 
the early winter of full civilization, instead of in the golden summit of ripe culture’.72  
Maurras once declared that ‘nothing authorizes this act of faith in the indefinite progress of 
the human race’.73  Visually, decadence figured, for instance, in Nazi representations of 
cosmetics and cigarettes as ‘corrupting’ of German womanhood.74  Autobiographically even, 
decadence – together with its prospective solution through ‘rebirth’ – figured in Mein Kampf, 
in Hitler’s narration of Germany’s ‘illness’ and ‘decay’ by personification.75  Decadence’s 
ubiquity in fascist discourse is well-conveyed in the confession made by the French convert, 
Drieu la Rochelle: ‘I am fascist because I have measured the progress of decadence in 
Europe.  I have seen in fascism the only means of reducing that decadence’.76 
Yet even if heightened in fascism’s case, we should see ‘decadence’, along with its 
rhetorical richness, as stock to reaction.  Colloquially, we may even give decadence 
representative refrain: ‘the world is going to the dogs’.  Those ‘to blame’ – deserving of 
comeuppance – may, in the wider practice, range beyond those protagonists who were typical 
in the rhetoric of interwar fascism (‘the degenerate’, ‘the corrupt’, ‘the effete’).  Similarly, 
there is enough flexibility in decadence’s diagnosis to be made to promote a range of relevant 
modes of action, sometimes inaction.  Activism, on our earlier discussion, is one possibility 
in reaction, but not its requirement.  Decadence may in some cases be made to support 
‘rebirth’, as a kind of novelty (the case of fascism’s ‘New Man’).  In other cases, it may 
support rerun-of-the-past – more apt of Maistre’s backward-looking vision for the unbounded 
authority of ‘throne and alter’ than Counter-Enlightenment continuity theorists imply.77  
Equally, in passive mode, it may support just plain old nostalgia. 
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To this point, then, we have established the evidence that decadence is both prominent 
and open to rich communication.  We have now to clarify the mechanics of how decadence 
functions, when viewed from the perspective of the rhetorical approach.  This capacity of 
‘decadence’ to support quite diverse kinds of reactionary politics is revealing of its rhetorical 
properties in relation to logos.  Unlike ‘indignation’, it does not function principally at the 
level of emotion; nor, unlike Hirschman’s three arguments, does it call up probability.  
Rather, the model of argument in use is a very particular kind of argument by analogy.  
Decadence, as Matei Calinescu observes, ‘is a relative concept’ – without fixed contents – 
evoking rather ‘a direction or tendency’.78  In play is the organising metaphor of natural 
cycles: twilight not dawn, autumn rather than spring.  And though the distinctive notion of 
present-in-relation-to-past will be present in reaction, natural-cycle metaphors may be evoked 
so as to support any of the characteristic modes of action just discussed.  In the technical 
sense, and borrowing terminology suggested by Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, we can 
therefore specify thus: whenever decadence is invoked, an audience is being pressed upon to 
assess the political world with a ‘structure of the real’ in mind which that audience already 
accepts in another.
79
  It is because of this that the message is a powerful one – resistance to 
sharing the reactionary’s assessment of the world becomes no less than resistance to the 
truths of nature.  Cumulatively, once we tie decadence to indignation, we might imagine 
further the audience’s preparation for this ‘logical conclusion’ in virtue of prior emotional 
(re)adjustment. 
So we now have a basis, then, at a second stage, to inscribe decadence into our new 
reactionary repertoire, as its logos-component.  In respect of a contested issue in the history 
of the modern Right, we also have an idea of where the ‘revisionist’ alignment of fascism’s 
‘revolution’ to Marxism’s own needs moderation.  That needs just a little more elucidation. 
Certainly, as the new consensus pronounces, innovations in the early twentieth-century – 
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towards voluntarism, away from determinism – may have taken Marxism closer to modes of 
diagnosis and prescription in fascism.
80
  But the diagnosis of present-in-relation-to-past in 
Marxism is never ‘decadence’, for lacking – necessarily – will be the acute sense of living 
after a peak of achievement.  Intellectually, Marxists may on occasion have recourse to a 
kind of language of ‘disappointment’, when likewise possessed of a sense that ‘history’ is not 
on their side (disenchantment of the world, dialectic of enlightenment).  But this deviates, 
rather than replicates.
81
  Politically, when the language of decadence does intrude – as in 
Maoist denigration of ‘the City’, or Soviet condemnation of the avant-garde – perhaps it is 
rhetoric, indeed, that tells us fidelity to Marxism has ended.
82
 
 
Reactionary discourse (iii) Cold War anti-communism 
To complete the proposal for a new rhetorical repertoire of reaction, decadence and 
indignation should be attached to a third prospective feature.  For a final time, then, we will 
modify Hirschman’s consideration of reaction in a particular era.  Here, in order that our 
proposal showcases rhetoric in all three modes of proof described in the classical rhetorical 
tradition, an instance of the appeal to character (ethos) is identified.  This may be taken to be 
whatever proves to be peculiar to the presentation of reaction’s messages as ‘authoritative’.  
In completion of his own repertoire, Hirschman turns to the third stage of Marshall’s 
citizenship-development: the expansion of ‘rights’ so as to include social support.  In liberal 
democracies this entails the rise of the welfare state.   Representative of the reactionary 
arguments which are presented in the postwar era (thinks Hirschman contends) are those of 
Friedrich von Hayek and Samuel Huntington who, via the jeopardy thesis, both oppose state 
interventionism in distinctive appeal to a ‘zero-sum mentality’ – with the caveat that loss-to-
gain ratio is greater, not equal.  To hold this claim together, Hirschman concedes that anti-
statist arguments differ, precisely because the ‘good’ that is lost itself differs.  On Hayek’s 
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portrayal, it is liberty that will be lost (the state takes on ‘coercive’ functions).  On 
Huntington’s version, it is stability (the state ‘overloads’ its activities and generates 
unrealizable citizen-expectations).
83
  But Hirschman’s simple equation of reactionary politics 
with rejection of the welfare state is dubious.  A better argument will begin by noting that 
while Hirschman pursued the reactionary’s portrayal of the welfare state in detail, he 
neglected the topic which has a very obvious claim to exemplify reactionary ideology in the 
postwar period: the characterisation of communism.  
 
In rerouting Hirschman’s path through historical political discourse, once again a particular 
interpretive problem is raised: this time, whether to lump or to split.  Do we wish to paint 
Cold War anti-communism in many colours, containing many strands? Or instead to render 
anti-communism interpretation as ‘reactionary’ in whole, not part?  The latter is an 
interpretation on the rise. Increasingly commentators, pointing to covert CIA-funding, argue 
the case for placing ‘Cold War liberals’, like Hayek, in the camp of anti-communism’s 
aggressive pursuit.
84
  This implies that the demarcation between anti-statism and anti-
communism was fluid, so that the equation between reaction and opposition to welfare state 
becomes more plausible.  The view entails adding to, not replacing, Hirschman’s repertoire 
(perhaps consideration of anti-communist discourse gives us an extra argument to add to his 
mix?).  That contention is not without basis.  The source-material here confirms that in the 
United States, Cold War domestic political mobilisation often tacked opposition to renewal of 
the New Deal onto very particular attitudes to the ‘Red Menace’85.  However, once more, this 
is an interpretive problem, the resolution of which may lie in rhetoric.  It is an appeal to 
‘conspiracy’ which is exemplified in Cold War anti-communism.  There is nothing in anti-
statism per se which favours that rhetoric. 
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That anti-communism in its strongest strands should be split from (mere) anti-statism 
is pointed to by the selective presence of distinctive kinds of motif.   The ‘zero-sum game’, 
the mental image in play in anti-statism, is fairly insipid. The motifs typical to stronger forms 
of anti-communism are more striking.  Of such motifs, the most documented is perhaps 
‘evil’, with its rich associations; best known in Ronald Reagan’s ‘Evil Empire’ 
construction,
86
 but actually in use much earlier.  The earlier use included the ‘birth certificate’ 
speech of McCarthyism in 1950, which pictured a ‘final, all-out battle between Communistic 
atheism and Christianity’.87  The ‘argument from evil’ is, then, one strong candidate for the 
final addition to our rhetorical repertoire.
88
   But ultimately, that move should be resisted in 
order to make a slightly more complex one.  The reasons are twofold.  First, to include evil in 
the definition would be to fix reaction in religion.  This would fail to give analytical reach to 
evil’s secular equivalent that also appears often in right-wing politics – the appeal to moral 
clarity, in denunciation of moral ambiguity. Second, to inscribe evil would prove the missed 
opportunity to identify reactionary rhetoric’s appeal to character.  To see why this is so, we 
may suggest that not evil, but a different trope of the McCarthyite era, is characteristic of 
reaction’s presentation of itself as ‘authoritative’ in this era: ‘Reds under the Bed’. 
 In the worlds of reactionary political discourse, it is the word ‘conspiracy’ that 
appears in frequent connection with evil.  In their conception, conspiracies house evil 
designs.  In their commission, the perpetrators enact evil deeds.  And in Cold War America, 
communism and communists were pictured duly.
89
  What separated American anti-
communism from its European practice, it has been suggested, was the discursive presence of 
an enemy who was secretive rather than public: the representative communist ‘looked like 
everybody else, hidden within the middle class’.90  In McCarthyism, the allegation of 
‘conspiracy’ was pronounced.  A speech of Senator McCarthy in June 1951, for instance, 
charged fellow-travellers with ‘a conspiracy so black that when it is finally exposed, its 
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principals shall be forever deserving of the maledictions on all honest men’.91  In 
McCarthyism conspiracy was also capable of meshing with the appeal to indignation, which 
we have argued is reaction’s distinct pathos: 
The reason we find ourselves in a position of impotency is not because our only 
potential enemy has sent men to invade our shores, but rather because of the traitorous 
actions of those who have been treated so well by this Nation… the bright young men 
who are born with silver spoons in their mouths are the ones who have been the 
worst.
92
 
Just as with fascism and ‘decadence’, so it is with McCarthyism and ‘conspiracy’— namely, 
conspiracy extends to reactionary ideology in general, and so what is pronounced and 
recurrent really amounts to exemplification.  The reactionaries of the Counter-Enlightenment, 
for example, assigned the French Revolution a myriad of conspirators: the philosophes, 
Freemasons, and the Order of the Illuminati.
93
  Needing little elucidation is the persistence of 
anti-Semitic conspiracy theory, stemming back to the early twentieth-century ‘discovery’ of 
The Protocols of the Elders of Zion.
94
  But what does remain to be comprehended is why the 
lexicon of conspiracy should so routinely equip reactionaries with the acts of persuasion they 
perform.   
Here, a source that helps to join up the dots is Richard Hofstadter’s study The 
Paranoid Style in American Politics (1965).  Hofstadter’s analysis lays bare the connection to 
evil.  The invocation of a secret plan comes to tally with the endowment of the protagonists 
with ‘demonic’ powers of deception.  The analysis also lays bare the connection to the 
reactionary’s sense of falling victim to historical time.  When conspiracy becomes history’s 
‘motive force’, says Hofstadter, reactionaries adopt a beleaguered view of themselves.95  But 
Hofstadter’s analysis leaves the more precise clarification of the status of this secret-plan-
cum-motive-force as a task for rhetorical analysis, a task that can be undertaken in relation to 
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ethos. The crux of the matter is the reactionary’s claim to privileged knowledge of a 
conspiracy (from the outside) as ‘testimony’.  Privileged knowledge impresses at least three 
things upon the reactionary audience.  First, the audience is invited to audit the veracity of the 
conspiracy’s allegation on the standard of the reliability of the witness.  This reliability is 
enhanced in the act of allegation itself, this being a feature that explains the otherwise curious 
tendency of reactionaries to appeal assiduously to ‘the facts’ – for example, McCarthy’s 
estimates of the number of subversives in public administration, or the scholarly pretensions 
of attempts at Holocaust denial.
96
  Second, the claim to knowledge about the political and 
social world that is specifically hidden amounts to disavowal of its conventional 
explanations.
97
  Third, it is also in the nature of conspiracy’s rhetoric that the reverse applies 
to any conspirator as applies to conspiracy’s witness. In character, or ethos, the alleged 
conspirator is neither honourable, nor trustworthy.   Everything taken together, we might 
even speculate this is how reactionary ‘leadership’ is performed.  Identification is established 
with a lone voice – indignant, roused by decadence – who speaks ‘truth’; not perhaps to 
power, but to progress. 
 
Conclusion 
In the interpretation of modern political ideology, the absence of a convincing theory of 
reactionary rhetoric, in place of one that was once creative but is since well worn, is pressing.  
This article has sought to argue particular cases both in respect of that absence, and 
concerning the content for a new theory.  The absence of a convincing theory has been 
registered at two levels.  On the one hand, reconsidering rhetoric demands that a new theory 
apprehend reactionary ideology beyond rationalisation and, indeed, beyond reason itself.  On 
the other, reconsidering reaction entails that a theory premised upon historical time will be 
more adequate than one premised upon change.  The content for a new theory will, 
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inevitably, be more open to debate than absence alone.  Nevertheless, there are good cases for 
foregrounding appeals to ‘indignation’, ‘decadence’ and ‘conspiracy’.  Will this content 
prove to be convincing?  Perhaps that remains for others to judge.  We have, in the least, 
demonstrated that with its application, interpretive issues particular to the Counter-
Enlightenment, fascism and anti-communism are moved some way towards their resolution. 
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